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United States v. Bryant, Federal Habitual Offender
Laws, and the Rights of Defendants in Tribal
Courts: A Better Solution to Domestic Violence
Exists
ABSTRACT
“If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.”
Since Miranda v. Arizona, that popularized phrase has widely been
regarded as true in the United States. However, because the Bill of Rights
does not apply to Native American tribes, defendants in tribal courts are
regularly sentenced to imprisonment without the aid of counsel. One of
those defendants was Michael Bryant, who has several convictions for
domestic assault and was not appointed counsel even though he was
indigent and imprisoned.
Domestic assault is a terrible problem in Native American
communities. Native American women suffer from domestic violence at
higher rates than any other racial group. In an effort to reduce domestic
violence in the tribes, Congress criminalized domestic assault by a habitual
offender. That crime requires two prior convictions, which can be obtained
in tribal courts. However, because the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) does
not guarantee the same rights as the United States Constitution, a
conviction may be valid in tribal court even though it would have been
unconstitutional had it been obtained in state or federal court. That
conviction may then be used as a predicate offense for domestic assault by
a habitual offender.
In United States v. Bryant, the Supreme Court held that it is
permissible to use uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate
offenses. The Court decided the issue, but a sense of injustice remains. It
seems backhanded to use uncounseled tribal convictions to prove an
element of a federal offense when those same convictions could not be used
if they had been obtained in a different court. This Note proposes three
solutions. One solution is to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act to make
tribal court defendants’ rights coexistant with state or federal court
defendants’ rights. Another is to give tribal courts the authority to impose
harsher penalties for domestic assault instead of leaving the federal
government as the only court system with the ability to impose adequate
penalties. A third proposal is to expand the jurisdiction of tribal courts to
205
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allow them to prosecute non-members who commit offenses on tribal lands.
Each of these solutions preserves the Court’s reasoning in United States v.
Bryant while making the process more just for offenders, victims, and the
tribes.
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INTRODUCTION
Michael Bryant is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and lives
on its reservation in Montana.1 He has more than one hundred tribal court
convictions, several of which are for domestic assault.2 In 1999, he
attempted to strangle his girlfriend and hit her on the head with a beer
bottle.3 In 2007, he assaulted a different girlfriend by kneeing her in the
face, “leaving her bruised, bloodied, and with a broken nose.”4 In 2011, he
assaulted another girlfriend, C.L.O.,5 “by dragging her off the bed, pulling
her hair, and punching and kicking her.”6 Bryant also admitted that he had
assaulted her five or six times.7 In 2011, he assaulted yet another
girlfriend, D.E.,8 by choking her “until she almost passed out.”9 He further
admitted to assaulting this girlfriend on three different occasions.10
Bryant’s pattern of violence is not uncommon in Native American
communities. While it is often difficult to quantify domestic violence
because those crimes are largely unreported,11 studies have consistently
found that Native American women experience domestic violence at higher
rates than other racial groups.12 A Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
study found that 45.9% of Native American women are victims of domestic
assault, as compared to 31.7% of white women.13 Likewise, a Department
of Justice study found that 30.7% of Native American women and 21.3%

1. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Bryant, No. 15-420 (citing Presentence Investigation
Report ¶¶ 26, 81 [hereinafter PSR]).
3. Id. (citing PSR ¶ 81).
4. Id.
5. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014).
6. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Joint Appendix at 38, Bryant, No.
15-420 [hereinafter J.A.]); see PSR ¶ 11 (quoting victim’s affidavit in which she stated
defendant “had repeatedly abused her over a four-month period and that the violence
escalated with the February 2011 attack”)).
7. Id. (citing PSR ¶ 35).
8. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
9. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8 (citing J.A. at 38).
10. Id. (citing PSR ¶¶ 28, 33).
11. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 104 (2008).
12. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 40 (2011).
13. Id.
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of white women experience domestic assault at some point in their
lifetimes.14
To reduce domestic assault in Native American communities,
Congress amended the Violence Against Women Act (hereinafter referred
to as § 117) to criminalize domestic assault by a habitual offender.15 That
Act has a predicate offense element, meaning that prior domestic assault
convictions are necessary for conviction of this federal crime.16 The statute
applies to “[a]ny person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian
country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior
occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings” for domestic
assault, sexual abuse, or interstate domestic violence.17 The penalty is a
fine and up to five years’ imprisonment if the victim does not suffer
substantial bodily injury or up to ten years’ imprisonment if there is
substantial bodily injury.18
Since the purpose of this statute was, in large part, to reduce domestic
violence in Native American communities,19 it cannot be viewed in
isolation from other federal laws that regulate criminal proceedings in tribal
courts. Although the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to require
appointed counsel when a defendant is sentenced to any term of
imprisonment,20 the Bill of Rights does not apply to defendants in tribal
courts.21 Instead, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) protects those
defendants.22 The ICRA differs from the U.S. Constitution in that it only
requires appointed counsel if the defendant is incarcerated for more than a
year.23
Because of this difference between the ICRA and the Constitution,
Native American offenders may be validly convicted of crimes in tribal
court proceedings that would be unconstitutional in state or federal court.

14. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T

OF JUSTICE,

EXTENT, NATURE,

AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 26 (2000).

15. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–02, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)).
20. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).
21. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the
United States Constitution does not apply to the tribes because they are “quasi-sovereign
nations”).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012).
23. Id. § 1302(c).
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For example, on several occasions Michael Bryant was convicted of
domestic assault in tribal court and imprisoned even though he was without
counsel.24 Those uncounseled convictions would violate the Sixth
Amendment if they had been obtained in state or federal court. However,
they were nonetheless used for the predicate offense element in the federal
habitual offender crime.25 In his appeal, Bryant argued that because his
convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment had they been
obtained in state or federal court, they could not be used as an element of a
federal offense.26
Bryant’s case presents federal courts with a conundrum. On one hand,
it seems unfair and unconstitutional to use convictions that would be
invalid in state or federal court to prove an element of a federal crime. On
the other hand, Congress determined that violent crimes against women in
Indian territory are a problem and ought to be reduced,27 so it provided
harsher penalties in § 117. Can tribal court convictions that do not comport
with the Sixth Amendment be used as predicate offenses for § 117?
This conundrum resulted in a circuit split. In 2011, the Eighth Circuit
upheld the use of uncounseled convictions for § 117,28 and the Tenth
Circuit followed suit twenty days later.29 In those circuits, it is permissible
to use uncounseled tribal convictions for the predicate offense element.
When Michael Bryant’s case arrived at the Ninth Circuit, that court
reversed his § 117 convictions, deeming use of uncounseled tribal
convictions unconstitutional.30 The Ninth Circuit’s holding therefore
conflicted with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations of § 117. In
2016, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split.31 In Bryant, the Court
unanimously held that it was permissible to use Bryant’s uncounseled tribal
convictions to establish the predicate offense element of § 117.32
The problem is now legally resolved, but a sense of unfairness
remains. Defendants are not afforded the same level of protection in tribal
court as they receive in state or federal court. Tribal convictions that would
not stand under the Sixth Amendment may subsequently be used to convict
24. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
25. Id. at 11–12.
26. See id. at 13.
27. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–02, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)).
28. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
29. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
30. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).
31. See United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
32. Id.
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defendants of an offense that may result in five or even ten years in federal
prison. This Note attempts to offer a solution to that problem while
retaining the sound reasoning of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Bryant. Part
I summarizes the right to counsel in federal and tribal jurisdictions, along
with the epidemic of domestic violence in tribal territories. Part II analyzes
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurring
opinion in Bryant. Part III proposes three viable solutions, each of which
would increase fairness to defendants, victims, and the tribes after the
Court’s decision in Bryant.
I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AND BRYANT’S
CONUNDRUM
The United States government enacted § 117 to reduce widespread
domestic violence, but the balance struck between tribal sovereignty and
federal law leaves tribal defendants without key protections. Because the
tribes are, to a certain degree, sovereign nations, the Bill of Rights does not
apply to criminal defendants in tribal courts.33 Part A offers a history of
tribal sovereignty and federal jurisdiction so as to better explain why
Bryant lacked the protection of the Sixth Amendment. Part B then
compares the Sixth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act to
highlight the differences in the afforded right to counsel. Part C provides
an overview of domestic violence statistics in Native American
communities for context on why § 117 was enacted, and Part D describes
§ 117.
A. Tribal Sovereignty and the Extent of Federal Jurisdiction
At the beginning of the nineteenth century and after more than two
hundred years of colonization, trade, war, and treaties with Native
Americans, the new United States government still had not fully defined its
relationship with the diverse Native American tribes.34 Three Supreme
Court opinions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall—Johnson v.
M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v.
33. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not apply to the Cherokee tribe because its power to prosecute crimes was not created by the
Constitution). See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on
federal or state authority.”).
34. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443 (2005).
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Georgia—attempted to resolve the question of just how much sovereignty
the tribes retained after the United States became a nation.35
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court held that land grants made by
Native Americans were invalid.36 The Court called Native Americans
“occupants” of the land, but held that “exclusive title” was conveyed to the
discovering Europeans.37 Chief Justice Marshall adopted the position that
“discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such
a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow
them to exercise.”38 Thus, Native American tribes were only as sovereign
as the United States permitted them to be.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sued for an
injunction to prevent Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee
territory.39 The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the Cherokee
Nation was not a foreign state.40 Chief Justice Marshall called the Native
Americans “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage” whose
“relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”41
Johnson established that Native American sovereignty was to be shaped by
the United States, and Cherokee Nation further specified the limited
character of tribal sovereignty.
In the final case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice
Marshall limited the states’ rights to regulate Native American territory and
confirmed the federal government’s authority to do so.42 Worcester, a
missionary sent to Cherokee land in Georgia by the federal government,43
was arrested under a Georgia law that prohibited white people from living
on Cherokee land.44 The Court deemed the Georgia law unconstitutional,
holding the Cherokee nation “is a distinct community, occupying its own

35. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
36. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 604–05.
37. Id. at 574.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2, 15.
40. Id. at 19–20. The United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction
over cases in which a state is sued by a foreign state. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Therefore, in
holding that the Cherokee Nation is not a foreign state, the Court held that it lacks
jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
43. Id. at 537–38.
44. Id. at 539.
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territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”45 The reason
Georgia lacked authority, however, is not because the Cherokees have any
power over the states. Instead, it is because the federal government has the
exclusive ability to regulate the United States’ relationship with the Native
American tribes.46 The Cherokees are not superior to the state; rather, the
federal government is superior to both.
A few decades later, the United States’ authority to limit tribal
sovereignty was tested.47 Crow Dog, a member of the Sioux Nation, was
convicted under federal law48 of killing another Sioux within Sioux
territory.49 He was sentenced to death.50 Crow Dog was prosecuted under
a federal statute that imposed death on any person who committed murder
on land within exclusive federal jurisdiction.51 The issue, then, was
whether the place where the homicide was committed—Sioux land—was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,52 or whether the
tribes retained jurisdiction when a crime was committed by a member
against a member within tribal land. Because of the then existing federal
policy, which left each tribe to prosecute crimes “according to its local
customs,” the Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction.53
In reaction to Crow Dog and to ensure that federal courts have
jurisdiction over crimes committed within Native American territory,
Congress used its authority established by Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and
Worcester to pass the Major Crimes Act.54 The Act provides that any
Native American who commits a major crime such as murder, kidnapping,
felony assault, arson, burglary, or robbery within Native American land and
against any person, including another Native American, “shall be subject to
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”55
45. Id. at 561.
46. Id.; see also United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2011)
(“Congress, however, enjoys broad power to regulate tribal affairs and limit or expand tribal
sovereignty through the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the
Treaty Clause, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.”).
47. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
48. Id. at 557. Crow Dog was convicted in the district court of the Territory of Dakota,
which had the authority to enforce United States laws. Id. at 560.
49. Id. at 557.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 558.
52. Id. at 559–60.
53. Id. at 571–72.
54. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); See also Keeble v. United States,
412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973) (noting that the Act was passed in reaction to Crow Dog).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
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Therefore, the federal government can prosecute the crimes enumerated in
the Major Crimes Act even if they occur within tribal land and between
tribal members.
The Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction of major crimes in
United States v. Kagama.56 In Kagama, the Native American defendant
was indicted for killing a Native American victim on the Hoopa Valley
Reservation.57 The Court held that the United States government is
sovereign and can legislate over Native American reservations because
they are within the boundaries of the United States.58 Prosecuting the
crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act is “within the competency of
Congress.”59 Invoking Cherokee Nation and Worcester, the Court called
the tribes “wards of the nation” that are “dependent on the United States”60
and held that “[t]he power of the General Government over these remnants
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell.”61
Kagama leaves no question as to the United States’ jurisdiction to
prosecute crimes authorized by Congress in tribal areas. The remaining
issue is the extent of the tribes’ jurisdiction. Tribal courts can and do
prosecute crimes that are not covered by the Major Crimes Act, including
domestic assault.62 Whether a crime is prosecuted in a United States court
or in a tribal court is a key question given the differing levels of
constitutional and state protection afforded to defendants in the two
systems.
B. Defendants in Tribal Courts Do Not Have the Same Level of Protection
that the Bill of Rights Provides
Congress can pass legislation regarding Native American tribes, but
because tribes are “quasi-sovereign nations,”63 the Bill of Rights does not
apply to criminal proceedings in tribal courts.64 In its place, Congress
enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act.65 Although the ICRA has many
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Id. at 376.
Id. at 378–80.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 383–84.
Id. at 384.
See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014).
Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
Id.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
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familiar protections for defendants, such as prohibitions against double
jeopardy66 and self-incrimination,67 as well as the right to a speedy and
public trial,68 it offers a lower level of protection regarding appointed
counsel than the Sixth Amendment.
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel
The Sixth Amendment states that “the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”69 The seminal
right to counsel case is Gideon v. Wainwright.70 Gideon was charged with
the felony offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit a
misdemeanor.71 He was indigent but was not appointed counsel. At trial,
Gideon was convicted and sentenced to five years of imprisonment.72
Holding that the assistance of counsel is a necessity in the adversarial
system, the court deemed his uncounseled felony conviction
unconstitutional, reasoning he could not be given a “fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.”73
Nine years later, the Court required appointed counsel for a
misdemeanor conviction for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon.74 In
Argersinger v. Hamlin, the defendant had received a ninety day sentence.75
The Court held that appointed counsel is required for any charge which
results in imprisonment, whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor.76 Like in
Gideon, the Court reasoned that a fair trial or plea could not occur in such
cases unless the defendant was represented.77 If unrepresented, the

66. Id. § 1302(a)(3).
67. Id. § 1302(a)(4).
68. Id. § 1302(a)(6).
69. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy . . . the assistance of counsel for his defense.”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (providing
that “[i]n a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe . . . imposes a total term of
imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant,” defendants will have the right to
effective assistance of counsel equal to that provided by the constitution and indigent
defendants will have a defense attorney provided at the expense of the tribal government).
70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
71. Id. at 336.
72. Id. at 337.
73. Id.
74. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1972).
75. Id. at 37.
76. Id. See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (clarifying that the
holding in Argersinger only applies to cases that result in actual imprisonment, not merely
the possibility).
77. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36–37.
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defendant would likely become the victim of the rushed, “assembly-line
justice” of an overburdened court system.78
These Sixth Amendment cases, taken together, establish the rule that
appointed counsel is required in cases where the defendant faces actual
imprisonment. If there is a violation of that right—if the defendant is
convicted, imprisoned, and did not receive appointed counsel or waive his
right to counsel—those convictions cannot be used for certain purposes in
later proceedings. For example, uncounseled convictions that result in
imprisonment cannot be used in subsequent proceedings to convict the
defendant under a recidivist statute79 or to impeach his credibility.80
However, uncounseled convictions that result in imprisonment can be used
as a predicate conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.81
Furthermore, uncounseled convictions for which the defendant was not
imprisoned can be used to enhance sentencing for subsequent convictions.82
2. The Right to Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings
While the Sixth Amendment requires appointed counsel if the
defendant faces any term of imprisonment, the Indian Civil Rights Act does
not require appointed counsel in all cases where the defendant is
imprisoned.83 Tribal courts may impose punishment of up to three years of
incarceration,84 but they are only required to appoint counsel when a
defendant is imprisoned for more than one year.85 Therefore, if an indigent
defendant faces, for example, six months’ imprisonment for a charge in
tribal court, he does not have the right to appointed counsel. If he had been
indicted in state or federal court, he would have had the right to appointed
counsel.
3. The Conundrum Created by the Difference in the Right to Counsel
Valid prior convictions can be used in subsequent proceedings for a
variety of purposes. As referenced above, they could potentially be used in
recidivist statutes,86 to impeach a defendant’s credibility,87 or to enhance
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 36.
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972).
See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1980).
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994).
25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2012).
Id. § 1302(b).
Id. §§ 1302(c)(1)–(2).
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972).
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sentences.88 However, issues arise when uncounseled tribal convictions
that resulted in imprisonment are subsequently used in federal or state
proceedings. Such convictions would have been unconstitutional if
obtained in a federal or state court, but are they valid in later United States
proceedings because they were validly obtained in tribal court? Or are
federal courts prohibited from using these convictions for any purpose
because they violate the Sixth Amendment?
This conundrum is particularly troublesome in the wake of § 117,
which criminalizes domestic assault by a habitual offender and permits the
use of tribal court convictions as predicate offenses. Before discussing that
statute, it is helpful to understand why it was enacted.
C. The Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Tribal Territory
Accurate statistics regarding domestic violence and its prosecution are
often difficult to obtain because those crimes are “widely believed to be
underreported.”89 One study estimated that only 53% of victimizations of
American Indian and Alaskan Native women are reported to the police.90
Despite challenges in measuring domestic violence, studies
consistently rank Native American women as the racial group most
victimized by domestic assault and rape. One in three Native American
women are raped at some point in their lives.91 The Congressional findings
for § 117 state that every year, “Indian women experience 7 sexual assaults
per 1,000, compared with 4 per 1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per 1,000
among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 among Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000
among Asian women.”92 Native American women are also nearly three
times more likely to be victims of a battery than white women.93
This premise is corroborated by three other studies, which also rank
Native American women as the group most often victimized by sexual
assault and domestic violence. First, a CDC study found that 45.9% of
Native American women experience physical violence by an intimate
partner, compared to 40.9% of black women, 35.2% of Hispanic women,

88. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994).
89. Brief for Dennis K. Burke, Former United States Attorney et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
90. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 52.
91. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 901, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3796gg–10 (2012)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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and 31.7% of white women.94 A Department of Justice study similarly
found, “American Indians/Alaska Native women report significantly higher
rates of intimate partner violence.”95 The study found that 30.7% of Native
American women experience physical assault, compared to 26.3% of
African American women, 21.3% of white women, and 12.8% of Asian
and Pacific Islander women.96 Further, a National Crime Victimization
Survey measured rates of intimate partner violence, which includes rapes,
robberies, and assaults, and found that “American Indian and Alaska
Native women have the highest rate of victimization (18.2) compared to
either African American (8.2), white (6.3), or Asian American (1.5)
women.”97
Assaults against Native American women are also likely to be more
severe than assaults against women of other races.98 In 70% of assaults
against American Indian and Alaska Native women, the perpetrator injured
the victim, and 56% of those injuries suffered required medical care.99
Sixty-three percent of assaulted African American women experienced
physical injuries, 49% of which required medical care.100 Finally, 60% of
assaults on white women resulted in injury, and 38% of those injuries
required medical care.101
Some scholars attempt to explain Native Americans’ higher rate of
victimization by looking to their history of oppression. One theory is that
“domination and oppression of native peoples increased both economic
deprivation and dependency through retracting tribal rights and
sovereignty,” placing them “at greater risk for victimization than other
groups who did not share similar historical inequalities.”102 A resource for
federal prosecutors and law enforcement lists several causes of domestic
violence in Native American communities, including “historical trauma,
geographic isolation, drug and alcohol abuse, the threat of homelessness,
pressure from friends and family, too few law enforcement officials
policing a vast amount of land, and an unwillingness to report offenses due
to dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.”103
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

BLACK ET AL., supra note 12, at 40.
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 14, at 26.
Id.
BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 47.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, USING FEDERAL LAW
PROSECUTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 9.
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While tribal governments have made important efforts to combat
domestic violence, the court systems’ structures and available resources
impact how those courts handle domestic violence cases. Tribal courts
often face “practical problems of funding, training, coordination, and
jurisdictional complexities.”104 They also have “scarce resources [that]
must be stretched across vast geographic areas,” and “[t]he victims face
even greater challenges, as many live in small, isolated communities where
they may feel intense pressure to remain silent, or fear violent
retaliation.”105 Therefore, a history of oppression, poverty, substance
abuse, and isolation, combined with poorly resourced court systems, likely
explains Native Americans’ higher rates of domestic violence.
D. Domestic Assault by a Habitual Offender
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117 in response to the epidemic of
domestic violence in Native American communities. The stated purposes
of the law are:
(1) to decrease the incidence of violent crimes against Indian women; (2) to
strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign authority
to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women; and (3) to
ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women
are held accountable for their criminal behavior.106

In practice, the law targets domestic violence in Native American
communities. A group of former United States Attorneys filed an amicus
brief in Bryant, writing that § 117 is an “important tool” to stop the pattern
of escalating domestic violence on tribal lands.107 The facilitator guide for
prosecutors and law enforcement also encourages the use of § 117 to
prosecute domestic assaults in tribal lands.108
The statute itself is fairly straightforward. If a person commits a
domestic assault and already has two or more prior convictions for
domestic assault in any federal, state, or tribal court, the statute provides
that he may be convicted of domestic assault by a habitual offender and
imprisoned for up to five years, or up to ten years if the victim suffers
substantial bodily injury.109
104. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 69.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 5.
106. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 901, 119 Stat. 2960, 3078 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3796gg–10 (2012)).
107. Brief for Dennis K. Burke, supra note 89, at 10.
108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 28–29.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014).
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The problem with the statute is that it allows tribal convictions to be
used as predicate offenses for federal proceedings. A § 117 conviction
requires at least two prior domestic violence or sexual assault convictions
in federal, state, or tribal court proceedings.110 As described above,
defendants in tribal courts do not have the same right to counsel as
defendants in United States courts. A defendant may be convicted under
§ 117 using a conviction that was valid in tribal court but would not have
been valid if obtained in state or federal court.
II. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: UNITED STATES V. BRYANT
The applicability of uncounseled tribal convictions to § 117 created a
circuit split among the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which the
Supreme Court resolved in United States v. Bryant.
A. The Circuit Split
Three circuits have addressed whether uncounseled tribal convictions
may be used as predicate offenses for § 117. The Ninth Circuit held
prosecutors may not use prior convictions that do not comport with the
Sixth Amendment.111 However, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits upheld the
use of uncounseled tribal convictions to fulfill the predicate offense
element of § 117.112
In United States v. Ant, the Ninth Circuit held that uncounseled tribal
court pleas could not be used as evidence of guilt in subsequent federal
proceedings for charges based on the same conduct.113 Ant, unrepresented
by counsel, confessed and pleaded guilty in tribal court to killing his niece.
His confession and plea were subsequently used against him in a federal
trial for voluntary manslaughter.114 Since he was unrepresented by counsel
when he initially pleaded guilty, the Ninth Circuit held that it was error for
the federal prosecution to use that plea.115 This holding was not intended to
violate principles of comity or “disparage the tribal proceedings;” the tribal

110. Id.
111. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ant,
882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
112. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011).
113. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396.
114. Id. at 1390–91.
115. Id. at 1396.
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conviction remained valid even though it could not be used in the
subsequent federal proceeding.116
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Cavanaugh that
“the predicate convictions, valid at their inception, and not alleged to be
otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements of § 117.”117
While driving in a car with his children, Cavanaugh slammed his wife’s
head into the dashboard and threatened to kill her.118 He was charged
under § 117, but the district court dismissed the indictment because the
predicate offenses were uncounseled.119 In reversing the district court, the
Eighth Circuit emphasized that the prior, predicate convictions were
constitutionally sound because they were obtained in tribal court in
compliance with the ICRA.120 The court held it could not “preclude use of
the prior conviction merely because it would have been invalid had it arisen
from a state or federal court.”121 The court distinguished its holding from
Ant based on the conduct at issue in each case. In Ant, the tribal conviction
was used to prove a federal offense based on the same conduct. However,
in § 117, the domestic assault for which defendant is tried is based on
conduct different from that in the predicate offenses.122
The Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in United States v. Shavanaux
twenty days after Cavanaugh, also holding that prior uncounseled
convictions could be used as predicate offenses under § 117.123 In
Shavanaux, the indigent defendant was not appointed counsel but was
represented in his tribal cases by a lay advocate that he hired himself.124
On appeal, the defendant raised Sixth Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection claims.125 The court held that the Sixth Amendment was not
violated when the convictions were obtained because it did not apply to the
tribal court proceedings. Therefore, it could not be violated when those
valid convictions were used in federal court.126 Additionally, the court held
there was no Due Process violation because the tribal convictions complied
with the ICRA.127 Shavanaux argued that because § 117 targets Native
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603–05.
Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1000.
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American communities, it violates his right to equal protection under the
law.128 The court disagreed, holding that his status as a Native American
“is not a racial classification, but a political one.”129 In fact, “Shavanaux
was not subjected to differential treatment in federal court because of his
ancestry, but because of his voluntary association with an Indian tribe.
Through his tribal membership and residence in Indian country, Shavanaux
chose to submit himself to tribal jurisdiction and the criminal procedures of
the Ute tribe.”130 Applying a rational basis test, the Tenth Circuit found
that § 117 is rationally related to the legitimate interest of reducing
domestic violence in Native American communities.131 Therefore, there
was no equal protection violation.132
Unconvinced, the Ninth Circuit went in a different direction with
United States v. Bryant.133 Bryant had at least five prior convictions of
domestic assault in tribal court, and although he was indigent, he was never
represented by appointed counsel.134 He did not receive more than one year
imprisonment for any of his uncounseled tribal court convictions.135
Therefore, his tribal convictions were in compliance with the ICRA but not
the Sixth Amendment.
In 2011, Bryant was indicted for two counts of domestic assault by a
habitual offender.136 He moved to dismiss the indictment, but the district
court denied the motion.137 He pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss.138 The court sentenced Bryant to
forty-six months in prison for each count, with the sentences to run
concurrently.139
On appeal, Bryant argued that his federal conviction violated the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.140 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the convictions violated the Sixth
Amendment, stating that “tribal court convictions may be used in
subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1001.
Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974)).
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1001–02.
United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014).
United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
Id.
Bryant, 769 F.3d at 672–73.
Id. at 673.
Id.
Id. at 673–74.
Id. at 674.
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counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment
right.”141
The Ninth Circuit distinguished its holding from the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Lewis v. United States and Nichols v. United States.142 In
Lewis, the defendant, without counsel, was convicted and imprisoned for a
felony in 1961.143 Lewis’s uncounseled conviction was valid because
Gideon had not yet been decided.144 In 1977, Lewis was convicted of
possession of a firearm by a felon with the 1961 uncounseled conviction
permissibly serving as the underlying felony.145 In Bryant, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished Lewis by deeming the prohibition on felons in
possession of firearms more akin to “a criminal enforcement scheme for a
civil disability,” while § 117 is “an ordinary recidivist statute.”146 The
court called Lewis a “narrow exception” to the general rule that an
uncounseled conviction may not be used in later proceedings.147
In Nichols, the defendant “pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute” in 1990.148 He received one criminal
history point for a 1983 misdemeanor driving while intoxicated
conviction.149 Nichols was not imprisoned for the 1983 conviction, so he
was not appointed counsel.150 However, the extra point for that conviction
increased the minimum sentence of his 1990 drug conviction by twenty
months.151 The Supreme Court deemed it permissible to use the 1983
uncounseled conviction to add a criminal history point, and thereby add
more prison time, to the 1990 conviction because the punishment was
solely for the 1990 conviction.152 The twenty months added to his
minimum sentence was not punishment for the 1983 offense; it was merely
part of the punishment for the 1990 conviction, which did not violate the
Sixth Amendment.153 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Nichols by stating

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 677.
Id. at 678.
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 56–57 (1980).
Lewis, 445 U.S. at 57 n.3.
Id. at 57–58.
Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
Id.
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740 (1994).
Id.
Id. at 740–41.
Id. at 740.
See id. at 749.
See id.
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that his prior conviction was valid under the Sixth Amendment154 while
Bryant’s predicate offenses were not.155 In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit
recognized its conflict with Cavanaugh and Shavanaux but nonetheless
held that it is “bound by Ant,” which held that an uncounseled tribal court
plea could not be used in federal proceedings.156 Accordingly, the court
concluded that Bryant’s charges ought to be dismissed.157
B. Bryant at the Supreme Court
To resolve this circuit split, the United States Supreme Court heard
Bryant’s case and unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.158 Justice
Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court, and Justice Thomas wrote a
concurring opinion.159
1. Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions May Be Used as Predicate
Offenses for § 117
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion began by summarizing statistics of
domestic violence in Native American communities.160 She cited the high
rates of domestic assault against Native Americans as compared to other
racial groups, and she cited the high rates of recidivism among offenders.161
Justice Ginsburg then discussed the limited authority of tribal courts to
impose punishment.162 Although Congress amended the ICRA to allow
tribal courts to sentence defendants to three years of incarceration instead
of only one, Ginsburg noted, “few tribes have employed this enhanced
sentencing authority,”163 and “[s]tates are unable or unwilling to fill the
enforcement gap.”164 She opined that a sentence of only one year is
“insufficient to deter repeated and escalating abuse.”165 In structuring her
opinion this way, Justice Ginsburg described an insidious problem that the
154. Appointed counsel is only required when the conviction actually results in
imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). Nichols’s misdemeanor
conviction did not result in imprisonment, so failing to appoint counsel was not a Sixth
Amendment violation. See Nichols, 445 U.S. at 740, 749.
155. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014).
156. Id. at 678–79.
157. Id. at 679.
158. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
159. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2–4.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id. at 6.
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tribes and states are unable to remedy. She framed § 117 as the federal
government’s solution.
Justice Ginsburg then focused on Bryant’s history of domestic assault.
She wrote that his “conduct is illustrative of the domestic violence problem
existing in Indian country”166 and that Bryant committed “repeated brutal
acts of domestic violence.”167 Justice Ginsburg described the most
shocking facts of Bryant’s prior convictions, such as the fact that he used a
beer bottle to hit a woman in the head and tried to strangle her, and that he
assaulted a different woman by kneeing her in the face and breaking her
nose.168 She then described the 2011 assaults for which Bryant was
convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender.169 She
wrote that in one attack, Bryant repeatedly punched and kicked a woman,
and in the other incident, he choked a woman “until she almost lost
consciousness.”170 Justice Ginsburg likely chose to include these horrific
details to paint Bryant’s case as exemplary of the necessity of § 117.
In analyzing the constitutionality of using uncounseled tribal
convictions for § 117, Justice Ginsburg began by stating that Bryant’s prior
convictions were valid in tribal court.171 She wrote, “Bryant urges us to
treat tribal-court convictions, for § 117(a) purposes, as though they had
been entered by a federal or state court,”172 meaning that the Sixth
Amendment would apply and invalidate those convictions. By framing
Bryant’s argument in this way, Justice Ginsburg made it seem as if Bryant
was asking the Court to adopt a fiction. The convictions were not obtained
in federal or state court, so by stating that Bryant was asking the Court to
view them as if they were, Justice Ginsburg set up a good reason to
disagree with Bryant.
Justice Ginsburg then traced the reasoning of Nichols.173 Nichols
deemed use of an uncounseled conviction as a sentencing enhancement
constitutional because the punishment was imposed only for the latter
offense, not for the uncounseled conviction.174 Likewise, here, “Bryant’s
46-month sentence for violating § 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of
domestic assault, not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal court.”175 Bryant
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
Bryant, slip op. at 13.
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was represented by counsel for his federal conviction, so there was no Sixth
Amendment violation.176 Bryant’s convictions were valid in tribal court, so
they should not somehow become invalid in federal court.177
Justice Ginsburg then quickly dispensed with Bryant’s Due Process
argument.178 Citing Shavanaux, she held that there was no Due Process
violation because Bryant’s prior convictions comported with the ICRA.179
Finding no Sixth Amendment or Due Process violation, the Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.180 Therefore, based on Bryant, tribal
convictions will continue to be used as predicate offenses under § 117.
2. The Majority Opinion Glosses Over Tribal Sovereignty Concerns
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that he joined the
Court’s opinion because it was soundly based on precedent. However, he
also wrote, “[t]he fact that this case arose at all, however, illustrates how
far afield our Sixth Amendment and Indian-law precedents have gone.”181
Justice Thomas then addressed three premises upon which the Court based
its holding and wrote that while they are deeply rooted in precedent, there
is no “sound constitutional basis for any of them.”182
The Court’s first premise was that prior convictions obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment generally cannot be used in subsequent
proceedings.183 However, the Sixth Amendment only requires that the
defendant be represented by counsel in the present proceeding.184 In
Justice Thomas’s view, there should be no “Sixth Amendment
‘exclusionary rule’ that prohibits the government from using”
unconstitutional convictions as predicates for habitual offender laws.185
The second premise was that the tribes can prosecute their own
members in courts not governed by the Constitution, and the third
assumption was that Congress may authorize United States courts to
prosecute tribal members who commit crimes against other members on
tribal land.186 Justice Thomas wrote that these two assumptions are

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Bryant, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id. (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)).
Id. at 2–3.
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somewhat contradictory and “exemplify a central tension within our
Indian-law jurisprudence.”187 Bryant’s tribal convictions were premised on
the idea that the tribes are sovereign and may prosecute their own members
without the restraints of the Constitution, but his federal conviction was
premised on the federal government’s sovereignty to prosecute tribal
members.188 As Justice Thomas observed, “even though tribal prosecutions
of tribal members are purportedly the apex of tribal sovereignty, Congress
can second-guess how tribes prosecute domestic abuse perpetrated by
Indians against other Indians on Indian land by virtue of its ‘plenary power’
over Indian tribes.”189
In Justice Thomas’s opinion, it is impossible to definitively say that
either Congress or the tribes have sovereignty because a rule cannot be
generalized and applied to each and every tribe.190 Because “Indian tribes
have varied origins, discrete treaties with the United States, and different
patterns of assimilation and conquest,” they have retained different levels
of sovereignty.191 Justice Thomas posited a problem: United States
precedence has long treated the individual tribes as possessing equal
amounts of sovereignty, so it would be very difficult to now distinguish the
tribes and calculate the degree of sovereignty that each possesses.192 It
would be much easier to start with the sovereignty that the federal
government has over the tribes. However, Justice Thomas contends that
nothing in the Constitution gives Congress plenary authority over Native
Americans—neither the Indian Commerce Clause nor the power to approve
treaties allows Congress to prosecute crimes like § 117.193 Although
Justice Thomas posed this problem, he did not offer a solution. He
concluded by urging the Court to “reconsider these precedents,”194 but as
he acknowledged, the precedents supporting the three premises are
numerous and entrenched.195

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 1–2.
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C. Precedent and Policy Concerns Required that the Court Uphold
Bryant’s § 117 Convictions
Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on Nichols to support her conclusion
that validly obtained convictions are admissible in subsequent federal court
proceedings.196 Although Bryant seems distinguishable from Nichols at
first blush,197 the Court relied on Nichols as a matter of precedent and as a
matter of policy. Nichols appears distinguishable because Nichols’s prior
conviction, while uncounseled, comported with the Sixth Amendment.198 It
was a misdemeanor for which he received no imprisonment, and it was
used as a sentencing enhancement in a later offense.199 Since the Sixth
Amendment has been interpreted to require appointed counsel only where
actual imprisonment results,200 counsel was not required for Nichols’s
misdemeanor, and there was no Sixth Amendment violation.201 Bryant’s
convictions, on the other hand, were valid because of the inapplicability of
the Sixth Amendment, not because of compliance with it.
This distinction—inapplicability versus compliance—could be
significant in a discussion of reliability. Convictions that comport with the
Sixth Amendment are deemed reliable, and convictions that do not, like
Bryant’s tribal court convictions, may be unreliable in some cases.202
However, Justice Ginsburg offers an explanation of why Bryant’s prior
convictions are in fact as reliable as Nichols’s conviction. Compliance
with the Sixth Amendment hinges on whether an uncounseled conviction
results in imprisonment, but the outcome of the proceedings alone should
not determine the reliability of the proceeding itself. For example, if
Bryant’s trial had been exactly the same but he had been given a fine
instead of an active sentence, his conviction would not automatically
become more reliable. All else being equal, the difference between a fine

196. Bryant, slip op. at 13–15.
197. See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing its
holding from that of Nichols).
198. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740–41 (1994).
199. Id.
200. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that “no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he
was represented by counsel at his trial.”).
201. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 741–42.
202. See Samuel D. Newton, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The
Constitutionality of Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal
Trials After Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489 (2012). See also
Nicholas LeTang, United States v. Bryant and the Subsequent Use of Uncounseled Tribal
Court Convictions in State or Federal Prosecution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 211, 229 (2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should hear Bryant’s case and analyze reliability concerns).
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and imprisonment should not translate into a reliable conviction in one
instance but an unreliable conviction in the other.
Additionally, because the federal government extends comity to tribal
court convictions;203 deeming them unreliable could be an insult to the
tribes and an intrusion on tribal sovereignty. Both Bryant’s and Nichols’s
prior convictions were reliable, so the distinction between inapplicability of
the Sixth Amendment and compliance with it is immaterial in this case.
Because Nichols was on point, the Court was correct in following its
holding. Convictions that are reliable and constitutional at their inception
are also reliable and constitutional when used in subsequent proceedings.204
This rationale also serves an important policy goal. As Justice Ginsburg
mentions, confusion would have resulted if the Court had created a
“hybrid” set of offenses that are deemed reliable in one court system but
not another.205 It is better policy to give full effect to tribal court
convictions when they comply with the ICRA and to not doubt their
reliability. The ICRA is easier to understand and administer, maintains
comity with the tribal courts, and does not reduce tribal sovereignty.
The Court reached the correct result using the precedent that was
available, but a problem remains. It still seems unfair to allow uncounseled
convictions to be used in federal offenses because defendants in tribal
courts do not have the same level of constitutional protection as defendants
in state courts. Therefore, the proposals asserted in Part III do not argue
against Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning, but attempt to add to it and find a just
and fair way to reduce domestic violence in Native American communities.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS AFTER
BRYANT
With Bryant, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split.
Uncounseled tribal court convictions that would be unconstitutional if
obtained in a United States court can be used as predicate offenses for
§ 117. Even though this legal issue is now resolved, it is not entirely
satisfactory. While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is logically grounded in the
precedent of Nichols, it does little to address the unfairness created by an
under-resourced court system. Tribal court systems are often unable and
unrequired to provide attorneys for domestic violence defendants who may
later be sentenced to up to ten years in federal prison based on these

203. Newton, supra note 202, at 501–02.
204. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49.
205. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (citing
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 744).
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uncounseled convictions. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion recognizes the
problem of domestic violence in Native American communities, but it does
not address whether § 117 is the best option for combatting it. Three
solutions address concerns of fairness to defendants, victims, and tribes.
First, amend the ICRA to require appointed counsel for any domestic
violence conviction. Alternatively, repeal § 117, amend the ICRA to allow
harsher penalties in tribal courts, and require appointed counsel if harsher
penalties are imposed. In addition to either of these alternatives, federal
tribal jurisdiction should be expanded to allow tribal courts to prosecute
non-members who commit offenses within tribal territory.
A. Amend the ICRA to Require Appointed Counsel For Any Conviction
Applicable to § 117
Congress and federal prosecutors agree that enacting and
implementing a domestic assault by a habitual offender statute is the most
effective way to combat domestic violence in Native American territory.206
Section 117 seems to narrowly target the problem; domestic violence is
widespread in part because the recidivism rate is high, so by imposing
harsh penalties only for repeat offenders, the problem may be reduced
without unnecessarily ruining the lives of defendants who are sufficiently
deterred from reoffending by one conviction. Section 117 may be the best
way to reduce domestic assault. However, it still seems unjust for an
uncounseled tribal conviction to be used as a predicate offense.
Congress already amended the ICRA to allow tribes to impose up to
three years of imprisonment.207 It could again amend that statute to require
appointed counsel in all domestic assault cases.208 The Ninth Circuit hinted
at this idea in Bryant when it held that “tribal court convictions may be
used in subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to
counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment
right.”209 If the ICRA is amended to require appointed counsel in all
domestic assault proceedings, tribal court defendants would receive the
same assistance of counsel as any other defendant in state or federal court.
For that reason, this solution is fair to defendants. It is also fair to victims

206. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–902, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)); see generally Brief for Dennis Burke, supra note 89, at 10.
207. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012).
208. Katherine Robillard, Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions: The Sixth Amendment,
Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 2047, 2081–84
(2013).
209. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6

230

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

because it allows the federal government to continue prosecuting repeat
offenders.
A counterargument to this solution is that it is not fair to the tribes.
Amending the ICRA to require appointed counsel in all domestic assault
proceedings would trample on tribal sovereignty. If they are to be truly
sovereign and not “domestic dependent nations,”210 they ought to be able to
decide for themselves what rights to give to defendants. Justice Thomas
would likely take this stance; he wrote that the tribes historically gave up
different amounts of sovereignty, and they should not be treated as an
“undifferentiated mass.”211 He would likely agree that allowing the tribes
to make their own rules, in accordance with the amount of sovereignty that
each possesses, is the fair thing to do.
Although this solution is still better than leaving the ICRA
un-amended in the wake of Bryant, the next proposed solution does more to
preserve tribal authority.
B. Amend the ICRA to Give Tribal Courts Discretion Over Domestic
Assault Penalties and Resources for Appointed Counsel
Currently, tribal courts can only impose penalties of up to three years
of imprisonment.212 If they impose more than one year of imprisonment,
tribal courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants.213 If the tribes
could realistically impose penalties for domestic violence as harsh as the
federal penalties—under § 117, up to five years of imprisonment if there is
no resulting serious bodily injury and up to ten years if there is serious
bodily injury214—federal intervention would not be needed.215
In order for the tribes to realistically be able to impose harsher
penalties, not only does the ICRA need to be amended to allow for harsher
penalties, but it also needs to be amended to either (1) not require
appointed counsel for sentences longer than one year or (2) appropriate
federal funds to provide counsel for indigent defendants in tribal court.
This is because, as Justice Ginsburg mentioned in her opinion, although

210. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
211. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
212. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
213. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014).
215. See Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding
Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 185, 228 (briefly advocating for a waiver of the ICRA sentencing requirements for
domestic assault cases).
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they can sentence defendants to up to three years in prison, tribes do not
often impose more than one year of imprisonment because any sentence
longer than one year requires appointed counsel, and many tribes do not
have sufficient resources to appoint counsel for every defendant.216
The first way around that problem—removing the requirement to
appoint counsel for long sentences—would be unfair to defendants. They
already have a different level of protection in tribal court, and sharpening
the difference between tribal courts and United States courts would only
exacerbate that imbalance. Instead, the better solution is for the federal
government to provide funds and resources to the tribes so that they may
appoint counsel and fairly impose harsher sentences for domestic violence.
This solution is fair to defendants because, like the first solution, it
gives them the same level of right-to-counsel protection as defendants in
state or federal courts. It is fair to the tribes because it gives them a higher
degree of sovereignty; allowing them to impose harsher penalties grants
them authority that they do not have now.217
One counterargument is that this solution is not fair to victims because
there is no guarantee that tribal courts would actually impose harsh
penalties for repeat offenders in the same way that § 117 does. However,
in its amicus brief, the National Congress of American Indians expressed
confidence in tribal courts, drawing similarities to United States courts.218
Tribal courts operate under a system of checks and balances,219 offer
appellate review,220 provide protections for defendants,221 require training
for judges,222 and the Northern Cheyenne Tribes “have adopted the
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct”223 and “adhere to
robust and detailed codes of criminal procedure and evidence.”224 The
National Congress posits that “tribes have no interest in error-prone

216. See Bryant, slip op. at 4.
217. For a discussion on the importance of tribal sovereignty in this arena, see Barbara
L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime: A Tribal and Congressional
Imperative, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 321 (2013) (“[I]t is simply not acceptable to address
the problem by announcing that Indian people deserve the same rights as a person coming
before state or federal court . . . . [A] sovereign tribe’s right to define due process under the
tribal internal system must also be acknowledged.”).
218. Brief for National Congress of American Indians as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 10–14, United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016).
219. Id. at 11.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 13.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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courts.”225 Therefore, there is no reason to distrust that the tribes will
prosecute repeat offenders with the same level of success as the federal
government if they are given the chance.
C. Expand Tribal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-Members Who Commit
Offenses on Tribal Land
Even implementing one of the above solutions, larger jurisdictional
questions remain unresolved. Tribal courts are limited in jurisdiction.226
Jurisdiction depends on the identity of the defendant, the identity of the
victim, and the nature of the crime.227
Tribes cannot prosecute
non-members, even when they commit acts of violence against victims who
are members and who live within tribal territory.228
As Justice Thomas described, the tribes are not one entity; they are
diverse, and they have diverse needs and capabilities.229 The Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians (hereinafter referred to as the EBCI), located in
western North Carolina, provides an example of a tribe willing and able to
effectively prosecute domestic violence offenses.
The EBCI is a relatively small tribe with approximately 12,000
enrolled members.230 It also occupies a relatively small geographic area.231
It receives stable income from a casino.232 Because of its financial
resources and small territory, the EBCI has not experienced the problem of
being too under-resourced to provide counsel to defendants.233 In fact, the
EBCI requires appointed counsel for any charge that could result in
imprisonment.234 Every conviction therefore comports with the Sixth
Amendment.
An EBCI ordinance criminalizes domestic violence.235 The ordinance
states that “the official response to cases of domestic violence is that
violent crime will not be excused or tolerated.”236 Eighty-eight criminal
225. Id. at 12.
226. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
227. Id. at 208–10.
228. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
229. See United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 13, 2016)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
230. Telephone Interview with Justin Eason, Tribal Prosecutor, Cherokee, N.C. (Oct. 4,
2016).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. EASTERN BAND CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE § 14-40.1 (2010).
236. Id.
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domestic violence charges were filed in fiscal year 2015.237 Of those, 14%
pled guilty, 40% were dismissed (80% of dismissals were pursuant to a
plea), and 35% are still pending.238 For such a small population, this
number of charges filed is significant.
The EBCI has a robust and capable system for addressing domestic
violence. However, it is not immune to the problems associated with
repeat offenders, the defendants that § 117 is designed to target.239 These
repeat offenders are not sufficiently deterred by the limited punishments
the tribal court can give. When asked if § 117 is a useful and needed law,
Tribal Prosecutor Justin Eason responded that it absolutely is.240 He
described the “overlapping patchwork system” of jurisdiction and said that
federal courts are not well-equipped to handle day-to-day, petty crime, such
as simple assaults.241 “While the Violence Against Women Act242 of 2013
is a step in the right direction,” Mr. Eason said, “it goes to highlight the
gaps in criminal jurisdiction over offenders who violate laws on the
reservation, and these gaps need to be addressed . . . [t]he best forum for
them is the community in which the crimes occurred.”243 Mr. Eason
supports expanded jurisdiction for tribal courts, particularly in cases of
domestic violence where non-members assault EBCI members.244
Like the proposal to amend the ICRA to allow for harsher
punishments by tribal courts, Mr. Eason’s solution would be immensely
fair to the tribes, because it gives them a greater degree of sovereignty. It
would also be fair to victims, who would be assured that their own
community possesses the jurisdiction to successfully prosecute cases of
domestic violence. Finally, at least in the case of the EBCI, it would be fair
to defendants, who have a right to counsel coextensive with the Sixth
Amendment right.
This solution, however, may not be as feasible in larger tribes that do
not possess the resources necessary to appoint counsel for all defendants
facing imprisonment. Many tribes likely choose not to impose more than a

237. Telephone Interview with Justin Eason, Tribal Prosecutor, Cherokee, N.C. (Oct. 4,
2016).
238. Id.
239. Tribal Prosecutor Justin Eason noted, “We have some folks on the reservation who
are infamous.” Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. In this instance, Mr. Eason refers to § 117 as the Violence Against Women Act.
243. Telephone Interview with Justin Eason, Tribal Prosecutor, Cherokee, N.C. (Oct. 4,
2016).
244. Id.
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year of imprisonment because they cannot provide appointed counsel.245 If
all tribes had the resources of the EBCI, or if the federal government were
to assist the tribes in appointing counsel, expanding the jurisdiction of
tribes would be a viable solution because it would enable more
prosecutions in the local courts and communities that are best able to
combat domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
Bryant resolved a circuit split regarding the use of uncounseled tribal
court convictions when prosecuting defendants under federal habitual
offender laws. Because the tribal convictions are valid at their inception,
they may be used in subsequent federal court proceedings, regardless of
whether they are in compliance with the Sixth Amendment. The logic is
sound, but the result is unfair to defendants.
One solution is for the United States to continue prosecuting habitual
offenders under § 117 but to amend the ICRA to require appointed counsel
for all domestic assault cases in tribal court. That way, defendants are
treated fairly because they receive the same level of protection in tribal
court as defendants in state or federal court.
Another, and perhaps better, solution is to amend the ICRA to allow
tribes to impose harsher punishments for domestic violence and to provide
federal funds for appointing counsel for indigent defendants. This solution
is fair to defendants, who receive appointed counsel, and to the tribes, who
are given more sovereignty. Both solutions are fair to victims, for repeat
offenders would be still prosecuted.
A third solution, which may be implemented in addition to the other
two, is to expand the jurisdiction of tribal courts to enable them to
prosecute domestic assaults by non-members. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
in Bryant is soundly grounded in precedent, but amending the ICRA
according to any of the three solutions would be even better for defendants,
victims, and tribes.
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